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Abstract
The basis for Christian theology, the Bible, has come under considerable attack by decontructionalists in
their attempt to disregard authorial intent and to prove that understanding the meaning of an author's
words is an impossible task. Kevin J. Vanhoozer is an evangelical scholar who has done much in defense
of authorial intent and has found fertile philosophical ground in Speech Act theory. This essay looks at
Vanhoozer’s use of J.L. Austin’s variety of Speech Act theory to determine if Vanhoozer uses Austin
correctly, then turns to Vanhoozer’s bibliological use of Austin whereby he analogically applies Austin’s
Triadic formula of a speech act to the Trinitarian formula of the inspiration and interpretation of Scripture.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophy of language has quickly come to exercise significant influence in
all areas of spoken and written communication.
Concurrently, postmodern
perspectives of hermeneutics have gained seemingly pervasive influence both on
popular and academic levels. In the last half-century, “the author” appears to have
“died” but words have gained new life, posing significant issues within the Christian
church and its belief in the divine authority of the Bible. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, using
the pioneering work of J.L. Austin, has presented a way of using the philosophy of
language, particularly Austin and Searle’s Speech Act theory, to develop a way of
understanding God’s relation to the text of Scripture. Vanhoozer presents God in
divine communicative action whereby all the members of the Trinity have a
particular role to play within the act of communicating to his people, particularly in
relation to the Scriptures. A critique of Vanhoozer’s use and development of Austin
is appropriate in determining if Vanhoozer has used Austin properly, precisely,
respectfully, and validly. Vanhoozer could run the risk of loosing Austin’s intent
while at the same time trying to save the intent of “the author.” The following is an
investigation of Vanhoozer’s use of J.L. Austin, Vanhoozer’s Trinitarian application
of Austin’s triadic formula of Speech Act theory, and his constructive theology of
divine communicative act.
AUTHORITY OF HOLY SCRIPTURES AS ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN DISTINCTIVE
Before beginning a study on the relation of Vanhoozer’s use of Austin toward
a proper hermeneutic of Scripture and God’s action of speaking, one must
understand the classical, orthodox Christian position of authorial intent and
authority of the Bible. The Jewish covenant community and the orthodox Christian
Church have historically been rooted in the belief in the full divine authority of the
Holy Scriptures in understanding God, the world in which the Church lives, and
those outside the community of God. It was not until Enlightenment and postEnlightenment thinkers, both philosophically (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Spinoza)
and theologically (Schleiermacher, Ritchel), that the idea of Scripture as nonauthoritative entered onto the stage. For three hundred years this drama has been
playing, which often and erroneously pairs philosophy against faith. 1 Belief in a
divinely authoritative Scripture has always been a distinctive to the faithful
Church, and particularly in the Evangelical tradition. Belief in the authority of
Scripture and its ability to convey truth have been distinctives of the Church since
its inception.
Few English-speaking modern writers have contributed more to Evangelical
thought on the purpose and nature of Scripture than B.B. Warfield, a man deeply
rooted in Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Augustine. For Warfield, inspiration,
inerrancy, and divine authority are each a leg on a three-legged stool. In his work
Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing,
1982), 20.
1
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about the authority of the Bible, Warfield writes, “the Bible is an oracular book, - as
the Word of God in such a sense that whatever it says God says,” 2 and “[the]
attitude of entire trust in every word of the Scriptures has been characteristic of the
people of God from the very foundation of the church.” 3 An entire section of
Warfield’s The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible is dedicated to the
interconnectivity of “It says; Scripture says; God says.” 4 In the mind and writings of
Warfield there can be no question that Scripture not only has divine authority for
the Christian life, but also has such authority because it is the oracle of God in
written words.
The authority that comes from Scripture has its source in the “inspiration” of
Scripture. Inspiration is described by Warfield as “rendering that writing and
errorless record of matters,” 5 further showing how authority, inspiration, and
inerrancy draw from one another. Scripture’s verbal nature must necessarily be
part of the understanding and doctrine of inspiration, for inerrancy of the
autographs have no place in the discussion without the words penned by the human
authors. 6
A representative example that the Scriptures are the Word of God in a verbal
and authoritative sense can be seen in the contemporary theologian Millard
Erickson. He attests to the verbal nature of revelation and even the divine source of
the vocabulary that distinguishes certain writers of the Bible. 7 Erickson suggests
that God worked through the writer’s education, upbringing, and other areas to
prepare him for the task of writing a particular book of Scripture. So the
vocabulary, the particular verbiage used, is from God not in a “strict” sense but in a
“direct” sense.
The emphasis on the language of Scripture by the Christian Church has
created fertile ground for Speech Act Theory to make substantial inroads into the
cache of evidence for the defense of an authoritative Bible. The emphasis of the
words of Scripture as integral to the understanding and authority of Scripture
compose a significant place in the formulation and presentation of inerrancy,
infallibility, and authority that evangelicals purport. Thus, preserving the authorial
intent is paramount to the theology and praxis of the Christian religion. If authorial
intent is lost, much of Christian theology is lost with it.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPEECH ACT THEORY
The philosophy of language is one of the schools of philosophy that has held
significant attention and gained much influence throughout the past thirty years.
B.B. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Company, 1970), 106.
3 Ibid., 107.
4 Ibid., 299.
5 B.B. Warfield and Archibald A. Hodge, Inspiration, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book, 1979), 17.
6 Ibid., 19.
7 Millard J. Erickson, Systematic Theology, 2nd ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1998),
243.
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The nature, intent, uses, and conceivability of language has taken a prominent role
in philosophy and theology in various degrees. 8 J.L. Austin pioneered what is now
known as Speech Act theory, and his 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard
University brought Speech Act theory to the foreground. This work established
much of the terminology which philosophers and theologians use to speak about
speech acts. Austin instructs that in some cases speaking something is not only
describing it, it is actually doing it. Marriage, naming, and betting, among others,
are examples of the doing of an act when something is spoken. 9 Austin also codified
such words as speech act, performative act, locution, illocution, and perlocution.
Using Austin’s conceptions and language, John R. Searle systematized and
structured Austin’s Speech Act theory first in Speech Acts: an Essay in the
Philosophy of Language. Searle developed the concept of doing-as-saying in
suggesting that, when pressed to the how-do-you-know question, one may only
answer in a linguistically constricted form, 10 thus language is the foundation on
which knowledge rests. From a postmodern perspective, philosophers like Jacques
Derrida and Richard Rorty have deconstructively assessed language and authorial
intent, pronouncing the “death of the author” and of objective content-fulness 11
intended by the author in a body of text. The postmodern perspective of linguistic
epistemology can be boiled down to this statement: “incredulity toward meaning.” 12
Kevin Vanhoozer realizes the potentially caustic effect that an overtly
subjective reading of the Holy Scriptures could have on theology, for “one’s view of
God and one’s view of Scripture are mutually inclusive.” 13 Indeed, in postmodern
linguistic epistemology there is great danger to Christian hermeneutics, for how we
understand God and how we read his Word are inextricably linked. Some Christian
philosophers have fallen into this trap, suggesting that the propositions of the Bible
“fall short of expressing exactly what a speaker would wish,” thus compromising the
content-fulness. 14 It is the work of Austin and Searle that Vanhoozer uses to create
an apologetic for the content-ful nature of language contra the thought of the
deconstructionists. Vanhoozer uses Speech Act theory to counter the skepticism of
postmodern linguistic epistemology, leading the understanding of language to a
Keith Graham, J.L. Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy, (New Jersey:
Humanities Press, 1977), 1.
9 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 5.
10 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: an Essay in the Philosophy of Language, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 13.
11 The vocabulary of John D. Morrison found in Has God Said? (Eugene, OR: Pickwich
Publishers, 2006) is very helpful, including “content-ful,” “content-fulness,” “inscripturated,” and
“derivative Word of God.” ‘Content-ful’ (ie. full of content) is used by Morrison to indicate that
written or spoken forms of communication convey communicative substance contra the
deconstructionalist perspective whereby language does not convey objective content to the
hearer/reader.
12 Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There Meaning in this Text?, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 16.
13 Kevin Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics, (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 2002), 30.
14 Clarke Pinnock, The Scripture Principle, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), 155.
8
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place where a text, particularly the Bible, can be read and viewed with binding
authorial intent.
THE BASICS OF SPEECH ACT THEORY
It is crucial to understand the basics of Speech Act theory in order to properly
assess Kevin Vanhoozer’s use of it. Austin presents the idea that, in certain areas of
language, to say something is to do something. 15 He presents speech acts as
performative statements where the proper individual in a proper setting utters a
certain kind of statement in the proper context; thus, the statement actually does
something. 16 Austin uses the example of the marriage ceremony. When a groom
says “I do” to a bride during a marriage ceremony before a congregation, priest, and
family, that act of uttering the phrase “I do” actually marries the man to the
woman, even before a marriage certificate is signed or a ring is placed on a finger.
But, if this scene played out during a wedding rehearsal, it would be void. 17 In order
for a performative action to be “happy,” 18 the ceremony and setting must be in
place. 19
There are certain performatives that cannot simply be verbalized in a direct
way. In order for certain actions to be, they must be spoken. It is the difference
between “I insult you” and “You are ugly.” The former has no performative
significance, but the latter does. 20 Austin expounds on situations that exist verbally
and implicate an individual to present or future action, as in saying, “I apologize.”21
In order for the performative of “I apologize” to be happy, one must act upon the
implication from which that statement compels them toward. If a man says “I
apologize” to his wife for an insult but then immediately insults again, the
performative was not happy. Or, if one says, “John’s kids are bad” when John has
no children, this performative is void. 22 Therefore, the actual words, the meaning of
the words, and the action that the words require are all-important. These three
elements make up a speech act.
Austin presents speech acts as triadic, consisting of the locution, illocution,
and perlocution. A locution is the “act of saying something” and is the first
necessary part of communication. 23 It is the basic physical act of uttering noises
that make words which make sentences. The illocutionary act goes hand-in-hand
Austin, Words, 8.
Ibid., 27.
17 Ibid., 20.
18 Austin uses the term ‘felicitous’ and ‘happy’ synonymously. A ‘performative’ is ‘happy’ when
the intended result of the performative is accomplished for the right reasons within the right
context, and not when one of the performers is under duress or accomplishes the performative on
accident. See pages 14-15 in Austin’s Words for further explanation.
19 Ibid., 22.
20 Ibid., 31.
21 Ibid., 46.
22 Ibid., 51.
23 Ibid., 94.
15
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with the locution in that Austin says to perform a locutionary act is also “eo ipso to
perform an illocutionary act.” The illocutionary act is the performance of an act in
saying something. 24 Austin has difficulty finding the proper words to separate the
locution from the illocution, for they are closely linked and almost intermingle with
one another. The primary difference between the locutionary act and the
illocutionary act is “the performance of an act in saying something as opposed to
performance of an act of saying something.” 25 The perlocutionary act is the
consequential effect of the locution and illocution, or what happens due to the
locution and illocution. 26 The locution, illocution, and perlocution make up a speech
act, and an example of such is when a man hears “Shoot her!” (locution), the man
was urged to shoot her (illocution), and the man was persuaded to shoot her
(perlocution). 27
Austin stresses that the illocutionary act is the lynchpin of speech acts, or the
act that hinges the perlocution and locution together for significance. 28 Illocution is
the most important element within a speech act because it specifies the content of
the utterance, 29 and the most important aspect of the illocutionary act is that it
makes explicit the content. 30 Therefore, the content-fulness of the entire speech act
lies within the illocutionary act.
KEVIN VANHOOZER’S USE OF SPEECH ACTS
Kevin Vanhoozer is one of the most influential evangelical scholars to use
Speech Act theory against the skepticism of postmodern literary epistemology.
Through his study of the philosophy of language, Vanhoozer has found great
potential in the work of Austin and Searle to overcome the dichotomy of personalpropositional revelation. The primary idea taken from these men and Speech Act
theory is that speech acts “allows us to transcend the debilitating dichotomy
between revelation as ‘God saying’ and ‘God doing’. For the category of speech-act
acknowledges that saying too is a doing.” 31
Vanhoozer presents the Bible preeminently as the collection of God’s speech
acts. 32 God as a communicative agent and Scripture as the reliable and
Ibid., 98.
Ibid., 99. In How to Do Things with Words Austin explains the difference between locution
and perlocution implicitly by presenting instances of successful speech acts instead of extrapolating
on an analytic definition of both. For more information on the differences and distinctives of locution
and illocution, see John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language pages 22-26,
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology pages 154-155, John D. Morrison Has God Said? pages 65-71.
26 Ibid., 101.
27 Ibid., 102.
28 Ibid., 103.
29 William P. Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2000), 13.
30 Ibid., 26.
31 Kevin Vanhoozer, A Pathway into the Holy Scriptures, (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans,
1994), 147.
32 Kevin Vanhoozer, First Theology, 131.
24
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authoritative source of the recordings of his speech acts is the source from which a
properly biblical hermeneutic comes. The covenants found in Scripture are the focus
of the Bible, and the speech acts are the “principle mode in which God is ‘with’ his
people.” 33
Vanhoozer presents the triadic formula of Austin’s speech acts as a
Trinitarian formula for the Godhead’s communicative action. The Father is the
locutionary agent who speaks, begets, and sustains primarily through the
“providential involvement in the lives of the human authors of Scripture.” 34 The
Father uses humans to create a mighty speech act in and as Holy Scripture. Jesus
Christ is the illocutionary agent because he is what is conveyed in the Trinitarian
speech act. The Logos has content and intent within his action. The action of the
Logos is objective because it is determined by the speaker. The perlocutionary
action is the Spirit’s work in relation to the reader’s understanding of the
inscripturated Word of God. 35 The Spirit “delivers” or “brings home” the words to
the reader, thus compelling him toward an action, whether belief, repentance, or
something else. It is through the idea of God as a communicative agent that
Vanhoozer sees Scripture as a divine act in which the Father speaks/begets the Son
who sends the Holy Spirit to make clear his message and call for adherence to the
message.
Vanhoozer does not stop at God’s action through a speech act but builds a
bridge from God’s speech act to his Scripture act. This is the key to anchoring his
theology of divine communicative action on content-fulness and not allowing it to
drift into either liberalism (cf. Schleiermacher) or extreme postmodernism (cf.
Derrida). Vanhoozer calls this a “covenant of discourse” which brings together
philosophy and theology. 36 The Bible is the “divine-human communicative action”
where “its locutions and illocutions are the result of a double agency.” 37 Drawing
from Luther, Calvin, and even Karl Barth’s understanding of inscripturation,
Vanhoozer points out Luther’s statement that closely follows his Christian use of
Speech Act theory that “God’s works are his words…his doing is identical with his
speaking.” 38 Historicity is integral in the speech act to Scripture act process, for
without the historicity of a text, meaning is only potential. 39 For Vanhoozer,
Scripture must always be seen as a historically bound book, for it was written at a
particular time for a particular people, but is applicable at all times to all peoples.

Ibid., 149.
Ibid., 154.
35 Ibid., 155.
36 Ibid., 161.
37 Vanhoozer, Pathway, 178.
38 Kevin Vanhoozer, Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology, edited by Sung Wook Chung, (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 56.
39 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 178.
33
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CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF VANHOOZER’S APPLICATION OF SPEECH ACTS
Upon initially reading Vanhoozer’s Trinitarian use and development of
Austin’s triadic presentation of speech act, an evangelical may be very eager to
accept Vanhoozer’s suggestions. It seems so orthodox because it is Trinitarian and
focuses on Jesus (illocution) as the center of what conveys truth. But one must first
investigate if Vanhoozer deals correctly with Austin. Is Vanhoozer’s illocution and
Austin’s illocution the same? And what of the perlocutionary elements of an oral
speech act compared to the perlocutionary elements of the Holy Spirit within the
reading of Scripture?
As was previously stated, Austin’s definition of locution is the utterance of
certain noises, certain words with a certain construct, and with a certain meaning.
Vanhoozer’s definition as the Father’s activity of locution is the “utterer, begetter,
and sustainer of words.” The word “beget” is laden with theological significance, for
the Son is “eternally begotten from the Father.” The Son being the Logos and the
Father being the Logos-emitter follows well with Austin’s Speech Act theory until
one looks at the speech act as a unit. Austin constantly focuses on a speech act that
is “felicitous” or “happy,” meaning that after the utterance is spoken and the
content is apprehended by the listener/reader, then an action (perlocution) is done
by the hearer. Unless this happens, the speech act is “unhappy.” 40 Therefore, the
locution and illocution must be completed in order for the event to be a speech act in
the full sense. Problematically for Vanhoozer, Jesus is eternally begotten from the
Father so there cannot be a “closing” of the divine speech act because there is never
a closing of the filial relationship of the Father and the Son. This leaves a speech act
in Austin’s definition as insufficient for describing the filial relationship within the
Godhead.
The use of “speech act” within Vanhoozer’s corpus of writings often takes
various forms and can appear to be inconsistent. For example, Vanhoozer says that
“the principle mode in which God is ‘with’ his people is through speech acts,” 41
referring to the written Word of God. But later in his writings he refers to a “speech
act” as the acting of the Son through the illocutionary force of his action, making it
difficult to determine when he is speaking of communicative action of the Bible or
communicative action within the Trinity.
Vanhoozer is bold when he states that an illocutionary force is what makes a
speech act count. 42 Austin never went this far nor did he use the word “count.” The
illocutionary act and force do not determine whether the act counts, but only if the
act has content. The perlocutionary element of a speech act is the part that “counts”
in the sense of a speech act being happy and achieving the desired effect. 43 In

Austin, Words, 115.
Vanhoozer, First Theology, 149.
42 Ibid., 155.
43 Austin, Words, 120.
40
41
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Christian theology, it is the death of the Son that makes available salvation, but it
is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that seals it. 44
The perlocutionary element within Austin’s Speech Act theory is the most
difficult to discern of the three acts, but he does consistently emphasize the
consequential aspects of perlocution. Perlocution is what is done because of the
speech act, and for Vanhoozer, it is the work of the Holy Spirit. The third person of
the Trinity empowers, indwells, and illuminates the reader to the person and work
of Jesus. 45 Vanhoozer sees the explanation of perlocutionary acts as the most
beneficial to Christianity, because the perlocution points back to the illocution like
the Spirit who points back to the Son through the inscripturated Word of God. 46
This movement in the speech act is through the illocution to the perlocution, and
the Holy Spirit is the one who makes the perlocutionary element efficacious for the
reader. 47
Other than the few vocabulary and interpretive issues, Vanhoozer deals very
accurately with Austin’s How to Do Things with Words. He stays true to the
authorial intent and does not manipulate any of the terms, ideas, or uses to fit into
a preformed argument. The previous issues were the only salient problems with
Vanhoozer’s interpretation of Austin, but all other uses are aligned with Austin.
Therefore, the next question that should be raised must be the jump from the
spoken speech act to the written speech act. Is this possible and appropriate with
Austin?
WRITTEN SPEECH ACTS: AUSTIN’S INTENT?
Austin very rarely addresses the transmission between the spoken speech
acts and those speech acts being conveying in written text. This is of utmost
importance to Vanhoozer and any Christian interested in using Speech Act theory
in defense of the authoritative nature of the inscripturated Word of God. The
question remains that, if Austin was interested in speech acts, how may we use him
for written acts? Two places in Austin’s writings give adequate grounds for the
transmission of spoken word to written word.
Austin deals with six devices for happy performative actions. They include
the following: mood, tone of voice, cadence, emphasis, adverbs and adverbial
phrases, connecting particles, accompaniments of the utterance, and the
circumstances of the utterance. 48 These categories help the speaker to understand
what the performative action is intending in doing, also known as the illocutionary
force. These six performative actions are performed by the speaker. An example is
an accompaniment of the utterance, which includes winks, pointings, frowning, or
Ephesians 1:13
Erickson, Christian Theology, 889.
46 John 20:31
47 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” in After Pentecost: Language and
Biblical Interpretation, vol. 2, ed. Craig Bartholomew, Colin Greene, and Karl Moller, (Grand
Rapids, MI: Paternoster Press, 2001), 43-44.
48 Austin, Words, 73-76.
44
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other physical signs. This is very difficult to convey in writing unless the writer
includes “and he winked” or some other indication. Another example includes the
circumstance of the utterance. If a young and healthy man tells a friend he may
have his farm when he dies, it holds much more significance if that same man was
on his deathbed or seventy years of age. Once again, this is difficult to convey in
writing unless explicitly expressed.
Austin leaves great opportunity to understand speech acts as text acts in his
qualification of the tone of voice, cadence and emphasis. He explains the difference
in understanding of the phrase ‘it’s going to charge’ with the use of an exclamation
point for a warning, a question mark for a question, and both a question mark and
exclamation point for a protest. 49 The use of time, cadence, and emphasis are
arguably the most significant of these performative devices, and I suggest that the
difference between a warning, question, and a protest becomes even clearer when
the speech act is written. Again, in this circumstance the content of the
performative action is better conveyed when written. This opens wide the
opportunity for speech acts to become text acts.
The second major point supporting Vanhoozer’s presentation of text acts is
Austin’s declaration that in certain instances a performative speech act can become
even more explicit when written down. As a review, a performative action is a
speech act when something is “at the moment of uttering being done by the person
uttering.” 50 Austin says that a performative must have a reference, and that
reference may either be the person speaking in the first person, or “in written
utterances (or ‘inscriptions’), by his appending his signature (this has to be done
because, of course, written utterances are not tethered to their origin in the way
spoken ones are).” 51 This is a direct link for speech acts to become text acts (and
thus Scripture acts), even the possibility that text acts may be the clearest way to
communicate content. John Searle makes this point even sounder by his definition
of speech acts: “Speech acts are characteristically performed in the utterance of
sound or the making of marks.” 52 Thus expanding on Austin’s theory, speech acts
are valid both as spoken and written acts, and the written act may even provide
greater clarity or explicitness to the act.
TRIADIC TO TRINITARIAN
It has been shown that Kevin Vanhoozer has dealt appropriately with the
work of J.L. Austin, thus providing the option of speech acts as text acts. A further
Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 60.
51 Ibid., 60-61.
52 John R. Searle, “What is a Speech Act?”, in The Philosophy of Language, 3rd edition, ed. A.P.
Martinich. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 134. Vanhoozer has much to say regarding
Searle’s categories of speech acts and his use of these categories for understanding canonical speech
acts. For more information on Vanhoozer’s use of Searle’s categories of Speech Act theory as it
pertains to salvation, see Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, (Lousiville, KY: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2005), 65-66.
49
50
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explanation is needed in Vanhoozer’s use of speech acts as Trinitarian in nature.
One must ask if speech acts can properly be seen as an economic working of Trinity,
and if so, what of “unhappy” speech acts? What if there is an absence of
perlocutionary action of the reader?
In order for Speech Act theory to apply to the Trinity, a proper understanding
of the economy of the Godhead is needed. An ontological Trinity alone would not
allow the distinction between the three acts of a speech act. Thus, Vanhoozer states
that the Trinity is “not merely the manner of origin (e.g., begetting, breathing) but
the sum total of their multifarious relations.” Therefore, there is an
interdependence upon one another within the Trinity, and, in this sense, the works
are what determine and configure the Godhead. 53 Vanhoozer is working backward,
using Speech Act theory to support the economic nature of the Trinity. He makes a
particular point to say that he is not pointing at a philosophical perspective and
comparing the Trinity to Speech Act theory. His use of the Trinity comes from the
“literary crisis about textual meaning” brought about by postmodernism, making
the point that his position is explicitly theological and not a justification of a
particular “interpretive approach.” 54
How does one see the myriad of threefold distinctions within Vanhoozer’s
works and not suggest that the Trinity is simply an ad hoc threefold analogy to help
substantiate Scripture as a divine text act? The answer to this question is the pith
of Vanhoozer’s constructive bibliology. He uses the language and philosophy of
Austin and others but allows the Trinity to have mysterious superiority over Speech
Act theory. He does not attempt to rectify all the paradoxical aspects of the Trinity
by forcing them into a philosophy of speech acts. He readily admits to the human
imperfection of language and allows for tensions and disagreements between the
Trinity and triadic speech acts. 55 These tensions include the orthodox position that
the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father and the Son,” but to Austin one may go
from locution directly to perlocution but never with content.
Another tension between Vanhoozer’s Trinitarian communicative act and
Austin’s Speech Act theory is the influence the Holy Spirit has in illuminating the
inscripturated Word of God about the ontological Word of God to the reader. Jesus
tells us that the entire Bible is written about him. 56 Scripture also tells us that the
Holy Spirit illuminates the reader to the truth of Jesus. 57 This is the reverse of the
triadic speech act formula of Austin. The perlocutionary act does not contribute to
the illocutionary or locutionary act, for speech act is a one-way street. 58
In Speech Act theory, the perlocutionary act must happen in order for the act
to be “happy.” This is not the case with a divine communicative action. Vanhoozer
talks of the “effectual call” of Word and Spirit whereby the primary role of the Holy
Kevin Vanhoozer, “Does the Trinity Belong in a Theology of Religions?”, in The Trinity in a
Pluralistic Age, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer, (Grand Rapdis, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 66.
54 Vanhoozer, Text, 456.
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Spirit is to “minister the Word.” It is possible to have “Gospel preaching without
regeneration.” Once again, there can be a successful or “happy” divine
communicative action without a “happy” perlocutionary effect. 59 This is a
foundational bifurcation of the thinking of Austin and the theology of Vanhoozer.
The next question may be, “How is Scripture used in the divine
communicative act?” The answer to that question is Vanhoozer’s “penultimate”
thesis in the connection of speech acts, text acts, and the perlocutionary effect. “The
Spirit speaks in and through Scripture precisely by rendering its illocutions at the
sentential, generic and canonical levels perlocutionarily efficacious.” 60 Using the
thought of William Alston to substantiate his point, Vanhoozer connects the
reliance of the perlocution on the illocution for the purpose of stressing the
authorial intent within the perlocutionary force. Scripture is used within the
context of divine communicative action, whereby the locution of the Father with the
content of the illocutionary act of the Son brings the efficacious perlocution of the
Spirit, all within the context of Scripture.
CONCLUSION
“Thus says the LORD, the King of Israel and his Redeemer, the LORD of
hosts: “I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god.” 61 The issue of
content-fulness and the words of Scripture are of utmost importance to the Church
and the believer. Indeed, without the content-fulness of Scripture the foundation for
which our salvation is based is in jeopardy. Kevin Vanhoozer uses the work of J.L.
Austin fairly, accurately, and respectfully to develop a constructive understanding
of how the Triune God is able to disclose himself in divine communication.
Vanhoozer does not ipso facto force a Triune understanding of the Godhead into
Austin’s triadic speech act formula, for he stays within the pre-established Biblical
and creedal boundaries. Nor does Vanhoozer confine himself by Austin’s work but
expands and elucidates Austin’s work, for Vanhoozer intends Speech Act theory to
be applied analogically, not as a formula to be ad hoc applied. The work Vanhoozer
contributes to the Christian understanding of revelation, inscripturation, and divine
communication is crucial weaponry for use on the battleground of authorial intent.
Vanhoozer shows how the philosophy of language, particularly Speech Act
theory, can help Christians understand a proper relationship between God and the
world. God communicates with his people, and Speech Act theory helps one
understand in what capacities God has communicated. It remains to be seen if the
“author” will die or live, but Kevin J. Vanhoozer has done much to keep him alive.

Kevin Vanhoozer, “Effectual Call or Causal Effect?: Summons, Sovereignty and Supervenient
Grace,” Tyndale Bulletin, 49.2 (1998): 248.
60 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 200.
61 Isaiah 44:6
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